The least bad resolution of the latest North Korean crisis

In the current North Korean standoff, Kim Jong-un needs to demonstrate to his people that he stared down Goliath and has tangible reassurance that the United States will not preemptively strike. China needs to be assuaged of its fear that when the North Korean regime ultimately fails, be it next year or decades from now, China will not be left unilaterally dealing with fleeing North Koreans. South Korea, meanwhile, needs a guarantee against U.S. abandonment.

The United States realizes Kim Jong-un will do whatever it takes to maintain power and relevance. Given the threat of mutual destruction, our strategy toward North Korea has been one of waiting for the despotic dynasty’s internal demise. However, it’s an approach that enabled Kim Jong-un to develop the nuclear weapons and long-range missiles he wanted.

{mosads}As we continue to wait for the regime to implode, the United States can improve upon its strategy. I suggest:

• As part of a negotiated deal with North Korea — which would include the usual lifting of certain sanctions, and possibly aid — the United States should agree to relocate further south all U.S. troops stationed in and around Seoul.
• As part of a separate agreement with China, the United States should pledge to not advance troops past the demilitarized zone when North Korea inevitably falls — and agree to withdraw all troops from the peninsula if the Koreas unify into a democratic, non-nuclear nation.
• The United States should convince South Korea to create a multibillion-dollar fund, managed by China, to support the resettlement of North Koreans who flee when the collapse comes.

It seems counterintuitive, but the U.S. military presence in South Korea would be a greater deterrent if most troops were based south of Seoul. In case of an unforeseen war with the North, the United States would not sacrifice as many troops in the immediate kill zone — they could live to fight another day.

Also, the U.S. force strength at the demilitarized zone cannot sustain a full-blown attack. The only thing stopping the North from occupying Seoul is the threat that the U.S. military poses from farther afield. Furthermore, such a troop relocation would prompt South Korea to invest more in its own military capability.

The U.S. military by 2021 will have mostly finished construction of Camp Humphreys, a base in Pyeongtaek about an hour south of Seoul. The $11 billion base, which welcomed the 8th Army this year, will house 1,111 families and roughly 45,500 individuals when completed. It is out of range of North Korea’s artillery and rocket launchers.

Yet an agreement with South Korea commits the United States to keeping one army brigade at Camp Casey, near the demilitarized zone. This is redundant. The very existence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a sufficient tripwire. There is no realistic military scenario in which the North would attack the South without lobbing missiles at the roughly dozen U.S. military installations in South Korea, ensuring U.S. participation in the hostilities.

Why offer a total troop relocation as part of a negotiated settlement with North Korea? Precisely because the United States is already partially implementing the plan, the only rational path for North Korea is to spin it as a victory. Since the North will continue to demonize the United States to its people, giving North Korea this chip to publicize does not hurt the United States. The full relocation of U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone would also be a gesture aimed at North Korea’s military brass and ordinary citizens.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s periodic machinations do not play to China’s advantage. Realistically, China does not even see North Korea as an ally, because both countries are only communist by convenience. Given a choice between awkwardly aligning itself with a troublesome nation with nukes in the hands of an unreliable leader, or a unified, democratic, non-nuclear Korea without U.S. troops, China would select the latter — as would any major superpower.  

The world is not frightened by China’s communist ideology blanketing the globe; rather, nations want to establish a working relationship with China that enables it to flex its muscles intermittently without routinely pushing boundaries. If China wants to take its place as a superpower, it needs to weigh the value of global stability more effectively. A pledge by South Korea to pay for relocation of North Koreans who flee into China should help China abandon its current, superpowerless position that North Korea cannot collapse because the instability might spread to China.

The United States has few effective strategies for dealing with the North, and even fewer novel ideas are viable. My suggested combination of policies would allow the North to back down while saving face, permanently motivate China to handle the North and strengthen the U.S. military position against North Korea.

The relocation and possible future withdrawal of U.S. troops would improve the delicate detente between the United States and China by giving the United States a legitimate reason to remove U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. This would not weaken the U.S. position, given that the withdrawing troops could maintain a presence elsewhere in the Pacific.

Whether the current standoff is simply a rerun of past diplomatic disputes or an existential crisis, the above suggestions are the least bad next move for the United States. And these policies are aligned with the Trump administration’s commitment to defend American interests but take a more measured role abroad by getting other countries to help maintain international peace and security.

Martin Skladany is an assistant professor of law at Penn State Dickinson Law. He is the author of the forthcoming book, “Big Copyright Versus the People: How Major Content Providers are Destroying Creativity and How to Stop Them” (Cambridge University Press, 2018).