The fall of an African tyrant

Following its overnight move against the presidency of Robert Mugabe last week, the military controls Zimbabwe’s capital of Harare, and it thus far faces no significant opposition in other parts of the country. It has placed Mugabe and his wife, Grace, under house arrest. The leaders of the ZANU-PF youth league, whose spokesmen had pledged “to die” for Mugabe have been arrested, as has the finance minister, Ignatius Chombo, while other cabinet ministers are on the run.

Within the military, it is unclear who is in charge. It has given no indication that Mugabe has been deposed as president, it has publicly guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, and it has explicitly described its actions as “no coup.” Harare is calm, with banks and shops open, and newspapers are continuing to publish, though the military did seize the state television station to announce the move.

{mosads}But the ruling party, ZANU-PF, has now voted to remove Mugabe as its leader. Mugabe and the military have long had a symbiotic relationship, with the balance of power between them shifting, but always within the ruling party. Mugabe, ZANU-PF, and military leaders have long run roughshod over the rule of law, rigging elections, arresting opposition figures, and committing numerous human rights abuses.

They destroyed Zimbabwe’s commercial agricultural economy by driving away white farmers in the name of land reform for Africans, while reaping enormous personal benefits. Through cumulative measures over the past 25 years, they destroyed one of Africa’s more advanced economies, creating economic refugees that have spread throughout the continent.

As the president’s power and health has declined, the military’s relative power has increased. Just last week, Zimbabwe’s War Veterans Association “completely disowned” Mugabe, removing him from his leadership post in the organization and expelling him altogether. Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom Mugabe fired as vice president last weekend, is understood to have a close relationship with the military at present, but Mugabe is still seen as the liberator from white oppression, and therefore has a strong base of power in rural areas.

The coup should not be seen as a popular uprising. Rather, it is a “palace coup” within the governing ZANU-PF political party motivated by a struggle between two factions over who will succeed Mugabe when he is incapacitated or dies. It is likely that recently deposed vice president Mnangagwa is behind it, representing a wing of the party made up of those who participated in the “struggle” to liberate Zimbabwe from white minority rule in 1980.

Mugabe removed Mnangagwa from the office of vice president, almost certainly to make way for his wife Grace to succeed him as president. She is leader of the G-40, the rival faction within the ZANU-PF that is of a younger generation and thus did not participate in the “struggle.” Hence, at issue between the two factions is not a particular policy or conflicting vision of the country, but who will ultimately control access to the “national cake,” or state resources, after the nonagenarian Mugabe is dead or incapacitated.

It is too early to say what the popular reaction to the military move will be. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have successfully emasculated the official opposition associated with Morgan Tsvangirai, which was already ineffective and prone to division. The most viable source of change is an unnamed street protest movement associated with Christian religious leaders that uses national symbols, like the national flag, to rally people against the regime’s human rights abuses and bad governance.

The movement has yet to articulate a larger message, as is true of many nascent protest movements, and Mugabe’s response has been to arrest and jail the movement’s leaders. It is unlikely that the military will respond any differently. Nevertheless, the fact that there has been a coup, and that Mugabe has, in effect, been deposed, may open the possibilities for popular opposition.

The response from the international community has generally been muted. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa has been the most involved, confirming the safety of the Mugabes shortly after they were put under house arrest and promising to send a delegation to Harare and involve the Southern African Development Community, the regional security and economic organization led by South Africa. It appears that outside intervention will not and cannot do much to affect the situation.

It is important for U.S. policymakers to understand that the coup may have removed Mugabe from power, but the regime he created continues. Therefore, there is little prospect for a quick or dramatic change in Zimbabwe, despite the change in leadership. There are unconfirmed rumors that negotiations are underway within the ZANU-PF and including opposition leaders for a transitional government. For now, the United States should urge restraint on all parties, and it should be supportive of the efforts by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union.

John Campbell is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as U.S. ambassador to Nigeria during the George W. Bush administration after a career as a foreign service officer with the U.S. Department of State.