As a matter of policy, the United States government seeks a free and open Pacific. This concept revolves around three key components. First, the United States seeks a world in which Pacific Islanders are free in their daily lives and reside in liberal democratic societies. Second, the United States seeks a world in which Pacific Island countries are free to manage their own domestic and international affairs. Third, the United States seeks a world in which the Pacific Islands Region is committed to the rules-based order that has governed international relations for decades.
In implementing this policy, the United States government must contend with the inherent tension between freedom, openness, and security in regional affairs. As Abraham Maslow taught us, the need for safety and survival dominates the need for freedom and independence. Given this hierarchy of needs, it is reasonable to expect sovereign states to prioritize foreign relations that ensure their safety and survival over those that promote their freedom and independence. Of course, liberal democratic states tend to prefer international relations with other liberal democratic states, all things being equal. However, all things are rarely if ever equal when major powers compete for access and control in small island states.
To square this circle, the United States government must constantly strike a balance between freedom, openness, and security in regional affairs. As suggested by Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, this is particularly difficult whenever there is a risk that confronting a partner government over its lack of commitment to democracy will trigger hostilities that could endanger the security benefits imparted by the relationship. One therefore needs to be mindful of where the Pacific Island countries fall on the political spectrum and where they are willing to engage in relations along the democracy-authoritarian divide. As it stands, several appear prone to such democracy-security dilemmas, including Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands. This arguably includes at least one liberal democratic state in Kiribati.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, the United States government has shown a pragmatic willingness to accommodate the non-democratic interests of other sovereign states in return for their strategic alignment against major power competitors. The diplomatic rehabilitation of Saudi Arabia serves as a case in point. Echoing Richard Youngs, this raises the question of whether the ‘free and open Pacific’ will be reduced to a mobilizing narrative for strategic partnerships that are only rhetorically driven by a commitment to strengthening democratic norms. Counter the pundits, the answer to this question still rests with the Biden administration and the United States Congress, who must decide whether it is in the national interest to reorder the region in full or part along the authoritarian-democracy divide.
In search of a coherent and comprehensive reply, the United States government will need to take into account the subregional dynamics at play in the Pacific. Aside from Nauru, the foundations of democracy are relatively strong across Micronesia. The subregion contains the Freely Associated States and many of the United States Pacific Territories. Plus, it is proximate to Hawaii. In contrast, there is far less of a commitment to democratic governance, democratic institutions, and rule of law in Melanesia. Apart from Bougainville, the strategic benefits to be gained by playing the democracy card appear less compelling too. For these reasons, one could argue that a stronger case can be made for reordering Micronesia along the authoritarian-democracy divide than Polynesia and Melanesia.
Whatever the strategic calculus, the United States government should seek to integrate and harmonize its policy approach within the region and beyond.
On the domestic front, a false dichotomy is often drawn between the domestic policy and the foreign policy of the United States in the Pacific. Paraphrasing Martin Holland, they are entwined and interdependent phenomena. Just look at the politics of COFA migration. On the international front, a false binary is often portrayed between the strategic collaborators and the strategic competitors of the United States in the Pacific. As Jonathan Hughes and Jeff Weis have warned, strategic partners are not simple, homogenous entities. Even among allies, one should expect some degree of divergence between what each perceives to be their national security interests and the priorities that should be assigned to them. Consider the Suez Crisis as an example.
To avoid such black and white thinking, the Biden administration and the United States Congress should take into careful consideration the perspectives and interests of the State of Hawaii, United States pacific territories, Freely Associated States, treaty allies, and Taiwan when deciding whether it would be in the national interest to reorder the region in full or part along the authoritarian-democracy divide.
Michael Walsh is an affiliate of the Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific Studies of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed are his own. He served as the Chair of the Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Subcommittee of the Biden Defense Working Group during the 2020 United States Presidential Election.