Lost amid all the news about Ukraine, uncontrolled U.S. inflation, and a potential recession in America is the critical issue of whether America and Iran will agree to return to the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — which should be a first-tier U.S. national security concern.
In October, at a joint news conference with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the United Arab Emirates foreign minister, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid said, “Iran has publicly stated it wants to wipe us out. We have no intention of letting this happen.” Conventional wisdom still holds that Israel cannot allow an existential enemy to have a nuclear weapon, especially one that repeatedly vows to eradicate Israel. Expressing Israel’s official position, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, has said, “A return to the 2015 nuclear agreement — or even if it is a similar accord with several improvements — is bad, and wrong from an operational and strategic point of view.”
Last year, 1,800 retired Israeli generals, officers and Mossad operatives wrote to President Biden urging him not to renegotiate the JCPOA, noting, “From a strict security perspective, [rejoining the accord] represents an existential threat to the Jewish state.” At this year’s Herzliya policy conference, Defense Minister Benny Gantz said Israel can rely only on itself. Iran, he said, is “just a few weeks away from obtaining fissile material needed for a first bomb.”
Israel may have had the tactical ability to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities in the past, but it didn’t rise to the level of strategic necessity. Now, new questions are emerging: What is the “red line” in the sand that will cause Israel to strike? If it strikes, will it achieve its goals? How will it tolerate missile attacks from Iranian proxies in response to its strikes?
In meetings I held recently with Israeli security, military, intelligence and political leaders — who have differing opinions on what a return to the JCPOA would mean — the recurring theme was that America’s unwillingness to have a credible military threat has hardened Iran’s negotiating position. There also was an overwhelming consensus that Iran will not change for the better, or lessen its hatred of Israel or America, simply by returning to the agreement.
Retired Brig. Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of research in the IDF military intelligence division, said if a new agreement takes effect, Israel will mount a covert campaign, since overt action at the first stage typically isn’t necessary. Initially, Iran probably will back away slightly from the nuclear threshold. Kuperwasser has said Israel must use that time to develop the ability to thwart Iran’s nuclear program with force and prepare for the consequences.
Failure to reach an agreement may force Israel to act sooner than it wants. Former Defense Minister Bogie Ya’alon also believes Israel needs a credible military option to deter Iran. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA without a “Plan B” was a mistake, he said. He believes America for decades patronized Middle Eastern leaders, held on to wishful thinking, and has not understood how things really work in the Middle East, where the only stable thing is the region’s instability.
Retired Maj. Gen. Yair Golan, a Knesset member and former IDF deputy chief of staff, favors a return to the JCPOA. Iran is the most formidable enemy Israel has ever faced, Golan said. Most problematic is the religious ideology of radical Islamists and their desire to expand the Iranian Revolution — and there’s no prospect for regime change in sight. To those who complain about the original JCPOA, Golan says it was the best that could be negotiated. Retired Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, former head of the Israeli National Security Council, said the choice now is between the lesser of two evils. Eiland also favors an agreement to buy more time for Israel to prepare.
I was surprised by repeated warnings from these experts that Israel needs more time to prepare for a military option. One would expect the current government to have inherited a more prepared military from former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s time in office.
There are three components to Iran’s nuclear program: uranium enrichment; the means to deliver a nuclear weapon; and the capability to weaponize nuclear material for a warhead. There is no stopping Iran from enriching uranium to 90 percent; the original deal allowed for advanced centrifuge development. Iran already has enriched to 60 percent. It also has an impressive array of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and reaching anywhere in the Middle East and Europe. This leaves weaponization, which most experts believe it is a few years away from accomplishing. That may be where Israel focuses its attention.
If Israel still subscribes to former Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s doctrine of never allowing any enemy country to have nuclear weapons, can Israel live with a threshold nuclear Iran?
Overwhelmingly, the answer I heard was “No.” When even hawks say Israel may not be ready to act now, it’s understandable why some want the U.S. to negotiate a deal and buy more time. Yet it isn’t clear that Iran even wants to rejoin the JCPOA; the lack of U.S. enforcement of sanctions has enabled Iran to return to near pre-pandemic levels of oil production for its primary client, China.
Iran’s leaders are patient and intelligent and may choose to develop its nuclear program in proxy nations, away from Israel’s prying eyes. But most of its program will remain in the deeply buried Natanz enrichment facility and places such as the Parchin weaponization site. There are other sites spread out across the country, making tactical interventions more complicated.
So, what is Israel’s new “red line” that cannot be crossed, regarding Iran’s nuclear development? When will Israel’s military option be ready, and for how long could it set back Iran’s nuclear program? The answers clearly aren’t simple.
Dr. Eric R. Mandel is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network. He regularly briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy aides. He is the senior security editor for the Jerusalem Report. Follow him on Twitter @MepinOrg.