Yes to Finland and Sweden in NATO

With Helsinki and Stockholm now formally requesting membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world will reach an important juncture. The overwhelming Western anger at Vladimir Putin’s Russia makes ratification by NATO’s 30 legislative branches a strong likelihood in the weeks or months to come. Turkey is objecting now, but some degree of debate, as well as give and take, within the alliance is normal in such matters. 

Putin’s heinous and unwarranted attack on the nation, government and people of Ukraine has unified virtually all of Europe and North America against him. In just a matter of months, Finnish support for NATO membership skyrocketed from about a quarter to three-quarters of the population. Apart from Turkey, NATO nations seem favorably inclined to the proposal — as we think they should be.

The central argument for bringing these Nordic nations into the alliance is that Putin has proven himself to be far more reckless than once believed. Until this year, his previous acts of aggression — at home and abroad — were carefully calibrated to avoid quagmires, limit the use of force, preserve deniability, and ensure that Putin himself would remain widely consulted by the West on most major matters of regional and global security. No longer. And for Russia now facing the likelihood of 10 percent or more decline in GDP this year and a far slower future growth trajectory than otherwise would have been likely, and suffering perhaps 20,000 war dead already — in contrast to the 15,000 it lost in the entirety of the Afghanistan conflict from 1979 through 1989 — the pain is enormous.

A leader who could so miscalculate is dangerous — he has revealed himself to be a major risk-taker with the potential for huge errors of judgment. Moreover, Putin is in trouble and therefore may be tempted to take action designed to change the strategic context. It no longer seems incredulous that he would move Russian forces into eastern Estonia or Latvia to “protect” native Russian speakers (who now have witnessed the true nature of Putin’s protective instincts); attack road networks in eastern Poland to slow NATO’s efforts to provide military supplies to Ukraine; or probe around other parts of NATO’s and the European Union’s eastern flanks, perhaps to shock the West into negotiating with him out of fear of further escalation.

It is hard to blame the Finns and Swedes, already often subject to Russian military provocations by aircraft or ships, for feeling anxious. Finnish and Swedish defense doctrine has long assumed that wartime movement would lead to new alliances, whether based on ties to Washington, NATO partnership, or the EU’s mutual defense clause. That is precisely what has happened as a result of the close-to-home war in Ukraine.

Finland’s and Sweden’s membership would remove unnecessary and dangerous ambiguity from the strategic map of northern Europe, not least by providing further alignment between EU and NATO membership. Putin sees the EU as an enemy, so it makes little sense for EU members to remain outside NATO. We also should not forget that it was the EU-Ukraine relationship that served as Putin’s excuse for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. 

There was always a counterargument to offering NATO membership to Ukraine: the linguistic, historical, cultural, religious and ethnic closeness of Ukraine and Russia made the idea of bringing Ukraine, but not Russia, into NATO a sensitive proposition — perhaps not unlike what it would mean for the United States if Canada chose to enter a rivalrous and historically adversarial security alliance. The point is not to excuse Russian atrocities, then or now; the invasion of Ukraine is Putin’s war and he bears the moral responsibility. However, there is a sharp distinction between Ukraine, on the one hand, and Sweden as well as Finland on the other. 

Despite some periods of Russian dominance of the latter, the Nordic nations are entirely distinct from Russia, with long histories and strong identities, intertwined with each other rather than Moscow. They always have been Western in orientation; now, they wish to be Western, in wholesale, in their security commitments as well. This is a logical, legitimate decision that we should applaud and support.

Finally, in military terms, the Nordic countries are defensible. Finland, in particular, despite its proximity to Russia, has excellent strategic depth geographically, as well as a hardy and militarily competent people with hundreds of thousands of reservists ready to be activated in defense of their nation on short notice. Yet it lacks the offensive forces that could cause any serious risk to Russia; it has about 100 tanks in its active forces, another 100 in reserve, and some 100 combat aircraft (including some brand-new F-35s, but hardly a major offensive strike force). Together these do not constitute a significant maneuver force; few countries have designed a more purely defensive capability than Finland. Sweden’s armed forces are similar in their chief characteristics, with a greater focus on naval capabilities.

Because of the capabilities of these nations, and the demonstrated weakness of Russia’s military, they will not need much help in defending their territories, especially in terms of ground combat capability. If there is a push for renewed U.S. attention, it should be toward the security of the many Swedish and Finnish isles in the Baltic Sea that can serve as the Western alliance’s natural “aircraft carriers” at a time of conflict. The bottom line is, NATO will not need to base large numbers of troops from the United States or other members in Sweden or Finland.

Indeed, it is the Baltic states already in NATO, since 2004, that are on much shakier military ground, with small territories, modest armed forces, and considerable geographic exposure. We will, as an alliance, need to make a transition from the trip-wire presence that NATO’s major countries have maintained in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 2014 to the rudiments of a combat-capable, forward defense capability with the potential for rapid reinforcement in a crisis.  Having Finland and Sweden in NATO can help in that process, given their proximity to the region and the Baltic Sea. This way, and because the two are technically fully compatible with NATO, Finland’s and Sweden’s membership would strengthen the security of other Nordic and Baltic member states.

Thus, on strategic as well as military grounds, the case for NATO membership for Finland and Sweden is strong. The time to act on their membership is as soon as possible, not once an uneasy truce prevails in Ukraine and NATO capitals may be less willing to disturb Europe’s fragile peace — or once Putin gets more desperate and looks seriously for additional ways to lash out.

Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, and author of several books, including “The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint” and “Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow.” Follow him on Twitter @MichaelEOHanlon.

Lauri Tähtinen is a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a nonresident fellow at the Center on U.S. Politics and Power of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He is the founder of Americas Outlook LLC, and co-founder of GEOSTREAMS. Follow him on Twitter @lauritahtinen.