Halting US virus research would endanger the world

Was it a lab leak?  Or did SARS-CoV-2 arise from the transfer of naturally occurring viruses from animals to humans? Proving either of these origin theories requires much additional scientific research; it may take years of study to come to a conclusion, if one is ever reached. 

The lab leak theory is sensational political news, stoking accusations of risky research and bioterrorism. It’s a catchy, high-drama story, with potential villains, based on easily understood suppositions. It is easy for the lay public to digest, providing the tantalizing ability to assess blame. 

In contrast, the scientific data supporting zoonosis cannot be presented so glibly. An accurate and truthful discussion of receptor binding domains, furin cleavage sites, viral variants, genome analysis and so forth will never be the screenplay of a Hollywood blockbuster. It is a battle of narratives where hard science will always be at a disadvantage. 

The furor over the lab leak theory has been heightened by political motives.  House hearings on the origin of SARS-CoV-2 overtly attacked virology, attempting to discredit virologists who believe in a zoonotic origin. The House hearings, and a Senate report on SARS-CoV-2 origins, embraced the lab-leak theory, inappropriately elevating its relevance in the eyes of the lay public beyond what the scientific evidence and intelligence information warrant.

Regardless of the origin controversy, the fact remains that nature is the source of viruses. Nature is persistently propagating them, especially in animals, which harbor many viruses transferable to humans. Such transfers have occurred with increasing rapidity — at least 13 times in the last 50 years.  Multiple reasons underlie the increasing frequency of zoonoses, with climate change heading the list. 

The politicized battle over the origin of SARS-CoV-2 ignores the fact that novel viruses are constantly spilling into humans. Many have no effect, but some will evolve to epidemic and pandemic pathogens. These viruses need to be identified and studied in order to be prepared for future viral pandemics. 

The power of present-day U.S. virology research was brought to bear during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The rapid development of safe, effective vaccines was a remarkable turning point in the pandemic. But the rapidity of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development is deceiving, because it was made possible by previous decades of painstaking virology research into related coronaviruses and work already in progress to develop coronavirus vaccines. U.S. virology research is critical for any global collaborative response to confront future pandemic threats. 

But U.S. virology research is about so much more than identifying potentially pandemic viruses. It is the scientific foundation of our ability to understand and combat all viral diseases. 

We live with the persistent threat of many endemic respiratory and non-respiratory viruses, those which have been with us for many years. These viruses exact a high economic and social toll every year due to their relentless effects on human, animal and plant health. Basic research to determine how endemic viruses cause disease allows us to develop methods to combat these diseases through the development of anti-viral drugs and vaccines. Such work is essential, but slow and painstaking.

The politicization of the origin of SARS-CoV-2 has undermined public trust in science and particularly in virology. It has resulted in calls for strict limitations on virology research which do not differentiate between emerging pathogen research and research on common endemic viruses. The unintended (or possibly intended) result will be the hobbling of all U.S. virology research.

In reality, U.S. pathogen research is conducted with strict safety oversight that builds on guidance and oversight from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as institutional biosafety committees. However, sensibly improving oversight of emerging pathogen research is necessary for safety.  While improving oversight may seem to some to be straightforward, it is not. 

New oversight must be well defined, differentiating between research with potentially pandemic viruses and research with endemic viruses. Unfortunately, oversight revisions before Congress, recommended by the National Security Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), do not do this; they are vague, ill-defined and nonspecific. Without clarification and refinement, adoption of the NSABB recommendations threatens to restrict even the most basic virology experiments.  This threatens the future of all U.S. virology research.

If U.S. virology research is hobbled by politically motivated, overly restrictive oversight, other countries will take the lead.  The U.S. will become beholden to other countries for vaccines, antivirals and the basic virology knowledge needed to combat endemic viral diseases as well as pandemic threats. The social and economic impact on the U.S. would be immense.

Anti-virology politics must stop for the health of the nation and the world. We need well-reasoned pathogen research guidelines that are not politically motivated.

James Alwine is a virologist, a professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania, and a fellow of the American Academy for Microbiology and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Felicia Goodrum is a virologist, a professor, a fellow of the American Academy for Microbiology and past president of the American Society for Virology.