The misguided push to weaken nuclear safety standards is gaining steam

Imagine a future where experimental nuclear reactors are scattered across the U.S. landscape like so many Starbucks, in densely populated and rural areas alike. Also, imagine they are allowed to operate without thoroughly reviewed and validated safety analyses, highly trained personnel at the controls, the protection of armed security officers, any provisions for off-site emergency planning and robust containment structures that would help prevent the release of highly hazardous radioactive materials if the worst happens. 

This is the future that many in the nuclear industry, along with their vocal supporters, are working overtime to achieve.

The only bulwark against the most dangerous proposals is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the independent federal agency in charge of protecting the public from the radiological hazards of civil nuclear facilities. However, the NRC is facing a coordinated, massive push by the industry to drastically weaken its safety and security regulations and speed up the implementation of its back-to-the-1950s dystopian vision.

NRC critics blame the agency for the slow pace of new nuclear reactor licensing and construction in the U.S. But the NRC should not be scapegoated for the nuclear industry’s own failures. These include repeatedly missing cost and schedule targets for the Vogtle-3 reactor in Georgia, or supplying technically deficient, inadequate applications, such as Oklo’s attempt to apply for a license for a “micro” nuclear reactor, which the NRC justifiably rejected, and NuScale’s application for a standard design approval for its small modular reactor, which the NRC found contained numerous gaps.

The industry’s ire has focused on the NRC’s development of the “Part 53” rule for so-called risk-informed licensing of new reactors, which proponents argue are so much safer than the currently operating fleet that they need far less regulatory oversight across the board. But the fundamental problem is that many of these reactor designs, which introduce new safety and security risks, only exist on paper or have had extremely limited (and not necessarily relevant) real-world experience 

The NRC is trying to develop a rule that provides regulatory relief for designs that are indeed safer — but requires applicants to provide sufficient technical analysis and experimental evidence to demonstrate those high safety levels are practically achievable. As NRC Chairman Christopher Hanson succinctly put it: applicants must “show [their] work.”

However, such analyses and experiments are time-consuming and expensive, and the industry has balked at Part 53 provisions such as requiring “probabilistic risk assessments” — quantitative technical analyses of all the things that could go wrong in nuclear reactors and how well safety systems work to mitigate accidents. While such assessments have many uncertainties, especially for novel designs without operating experience, it is hard to imagine a “risk-informed” licensing process that does not require applicants to quantify risks. 

Nonetheless, in response to industry critics, the NRC introduced an alternative framework in Part 53 to accommodate applicants that did not want to provide risk assessments. But instead of expressing appreciation for the staff’s efforts, the critics turned around and complained that two frameworks would be too cumbersome.

This back-and-forth is typical of the tortuous process of Part 53 development over the past three years, which has had an unprecedented level of industry involvement (a.k.a. meddling). It appears that while industry stakeholders offer differing opinions of what they do want, they are united on what they do not want: a rule with specific, objective criteria that the NRC can use to assess compliance and, if it finds violations, to take enforcement actions. 

While we are concerned that the quantitative criteria in the draft Part 53 do not set a sufficiently high safety bar, we are convinced that the rule must contain targets specific enough to provide a clear legal basis for NRC licensing and enforcement decisions. Anything less than that will expose the U.S. public — and especially, those communities who do not have the political clout or resources to keep these first-of-a-kind reactors out of their backyards — to needlessly high risks from radioactive contamination.

Some may ask why nuclear power still requires stringent regulation given that proponents claim it is already the safest form of energy. But although some nuclear supporters attempt to gaslight the public by playing down the massive health, environmental and economic impacts of the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima disasters, the fact remains that, unlike renewable energy technologies, nuclear power generates vast amounts of uniquely hazardous and long-lived radioactive materials as they operate. Not only are these substances highly carcinogenic, but evidence of their role in cardiovascular disease is growing. 

Keeping these materials isolated from the environment will remain a critical obligation of the nuclear power sector as long as reactors continue to run and nuclear waste persists. NRC’s statutory authority must remain focused on ensuring radiological safety and security.

For nuclear power to have a chance to expand safely and reliably to help mitigate the dire threat of climate change, rigorous NRC licensing and oversight are crucial. Our elected officials should allow the NRC to help advance the common goal of keeping communities safe, rather than prioritizing private interests. 

An accident such as Fukushima, this time on U.S. soil, could sour the public on nuclear power for generations to come.

Edwin Lyman is the director, nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists.