Command, control, and communications, or C3, is arguably the most important force multiplier in military affairs. In our increasingly digitized world, C3 is undergoing major modernization across the services, in both conventional and nuclear arenas. How we procure and secure our systems will be critical to maintaining national security.
Two recent cyber-attacks on U.S. soil — the Colonial Pipeline that provides 45 percent of petroleum needed by the eastern U.S. for civilian and military use, preceded by the unprecedented SolarWinds cyber-attack on hundreds of federal departments and agencies, and thousands of industries and utilities — highlights U.S. vulnerability. But these were only data breaches and ransomware attacks. As any wargamer will tell you, communications are the critical node in conflict. Our increasingly interconnected, interdependent world that relies on electronics, microelectronics, microservers, and semiconductors is vulnerable.
We are increasingly investing in integrated, digitized technology and telecommunications to make all aspects of our lives “smarter” and efficient. The reliance on automated systems and robotics is growing at an astonishing rate and will be further fueled by advancements in artificial intelligence and quantum engineering. These advancements offer millions of access points for bad actors to inflict significant damage or threaten lives through manipulation of cyber systems.
In last year’s National Defense Authorization Act Congress incorporated the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act. Authorization of the CHIPS Act was an excellent first step in protecting and building United States microelectronics capabilities to ensure our Nation’s security. Indeed, the Senate is poised to begin consideration of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act which would provide funding for billions of dollars to boost U.S. development and manufacturing in critical areas including artificial intelligence, quantum science, and 5G networks.
However, such efforts alone are insufficient, requiring continued focus, better follow through, and attention to detail. Section 889 of the Fiscal Year 2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act clearly prohibits federal agencies from purchasing telecommunications goods and services from five named Chinese entities in order to preserve and protect our nation’s security. Less well known is the issuance of waivers by the Trump administration from enforcing this section of law, with the latest extension lasting through September 2022. As we consider legislation and funding to protect and promote our “made in the USA” microelectronics and telecommunications industries, we should also ensure we enforce the laws already passed.
The United States Air Force recently announced they were ready to start buying some of the technology that will make up the Advanced Battle Management System, moving the program from theory into development.
“Nearly two years of rigorous development and experimentation have shown beyond a doubt the promise of ABMS,” Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. said in a May 21 release. “We’ve demonstrated that our ABMS efforts can collect vast amounts of data from air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains; process that information; and share it in a way that allows for faster and better decisions.”
The Air Force focus on next generation communications and the ability of its own separate weapons systems to be interoperable should be applauded. As a former Air Force aviator, this shortfall was always a confusing one. For example, the front-line F-22 fighter is currently incapable of communicating — other than over voice — with other legacy or state of the art aircraft systems. More confounding is how we can move forward with such critical programs as next generation communications without first having secured our supply chains from Chinese parts and pieces.
In the nation’s nuclear enterprise, we have begun a much needed $1.2 trillion dollar, 20-year modernizations program; details include new bombers, submarines, and ground-based missiles. The final area to be modernized, but as yet not fully spelled out in requirements or specific systems is the Nuclear Command, Control and Communications enterprise. The need for secure technology seems self-evident. A recent Congressional Research Services Report indicates questions remain to be asked and answered.
Demanding that the systems, subsystems, and even the parts and pieces that will make up this most critical enterprise be “Made in America” has not yet come to the forefront of discussion.
As Congress and the Biden administration work through how best to support and protect our nation in the cyber age, we must maintain focus and provide follow through, not waivers and business as usual. Attention to detail — buying parts and pieces from secure, reliable U.S. manufacturers throughout systems and subsystems are key to keep us safe and secure.
Gregory T. Kiley is a former senior professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and U.S. Air Force Officer.