The House Jan. 6 Committee plans to hold its first public hearing this evening on the Capitol riot, a violent attack that election conspiracists orchestrated to disrupt the counting of the 2020 presidential election results.
Good. The public needs to know as much as possible about this unprecedented attack on the underpinnings of American democracy. However, while the committee holds these hearings, election conspiracists are working on a new, nonviolent strategy to undermine the results of this year’s congressional elections. Unlike the Capitol riot, they plan to undermine the elections without breaking the law.
To address this threat, federal and state policymakers must clearly define the roles of election observers, challengers, and certification boards in order to prohibit officials from acting in bad faith.
Across the country, election conspiracists are increasingly becoming involved in the midterm elections by serving as poll workers, observers, challengers, and by running for the office of the county clerk and secretary of state.
Their new strategy was inspired by their failure to disrupt the 2020 presidential election. In 2020, Michigan’s Board of State Canvassers certified President Biden’s victory only because Republican board member Aaron Van Langevelde voted with the two Democratic board members (while the other Republican board member abstained). If not for Van Langevelde, Michigan may have triggered electoral chaos, ending only with the Supreme Court’s involvement. In 2021, Michigan’s Republican Party declined to nominate Van Langevelde for another term on the board.
While election conspiracists seek larger roles in overseeing the casting of ballots and the certifying of results, the election officials who are now in office are heading for the exits. In a 2022 Brennan Center survey, 1 in 5 local election officials reported that they’re likely to quit before November 2024. Why? Well, in a survey the year before by the Brennan Center and the Bipartisan Policy Center, nearly 1 in 5 election officials listed “threats to your life” as a job-related concern.
Efforts to question the legitimacy of elections are not confined to the Republican Party. President Biden suggested that the midterm elections could be illegitimate if Congress does not pass federal election reform, which it has not.
Following her loss in the 2018 Georgia governor’s race, Democrat Stacey Abrams declined to concede, saying “[Republican Brian Kemp] won under the rules of the game at the time, but the game was rigged against the voters of Georgia.” Abrams will likely face Kemp again in this year’s Georgia governor’s race.
Federal and state policymakers need to recognize the danger on the horizon and make it much harder to disrupt free and fair elections. What must they do?
For one thing, state policymakers must set tighter rules for election observers and challengers. Many state policies lack clarity around which processes observers and challengers can witness and what happens when an observer or challenger intentionally disrupts voting. Observers and challengers are a necessary part of transparent and trustworthy elections but, due to lax rules, observers and challengers have the leeway to exploit their roles and undermine the election process.
For another thing, federal policymakers should require that, for federal contests, states’ election results are automatically certified unless a court finds evidence of fraud that exceeds the margin of victory. The threat of a certification board failing to certify a free and fair election result is greater in 2022 than in 2020, and it will be greater still in 2024 without federal legislation.
Policymakers cannot legislate away the conspiracy theories that undermine our democracy, nor can they mandate that people always act in good faith. But federal and state policymakers can and should take proactive steps to strengthen our democratic processes against foreseen threats.
Matthew Weil is director of the Elections Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. He previously served in staff roles at the Treasury Department and at the United States Election Assistance Commission.