Congress must stop Biden from fueling a Saudi nuclear bomb  

Editor’s note: The story has been updated to correct circumstances surrounding National Security Advisor’s Jake Sullivan’s trip to Saudi Arabia. We regret the error.

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan is heading to Saudi Arabia and Israel this weekend in hopes of delivering an elusive Biden foreign policy triumph — a U.S.-Saudi-Israel “mega deal” that would upgrade the U.S.-Saudi alliance while normalizing relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem.  

Proponents see this as a win-win proposition, yet at the deal’s heart lies a dangerous American concession: Saudi Arabia is demanding Washington upend decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and give Riyadh the means to enrich uranium — a process essential to producing fuel for either nuclear reactors or atomic weapons. Congress must act now and stop the administration from setting off a nuclear arms-race in the Middle East. 

Never before has the Saudi motivation been so high to join the Western-led security order: The recent salvo of drones and missiles Iran launched at Israel were almost entirely eliminated by the missile defenses of the U.S., Israel and partners. This is the kind of protection Russia, China and Iran, with their venal and revisionist ambitions, are unlikely to provide.  

President Biden has a narrowing window to secure the mega-deal, after spending his first years in office taking Riyadh to task on human rights and downplaying the Abraham Accords, through which his predecessor helped three Arab states normalize relations with Israel.  

Beyond the non-trivial matters of the ongoing Israeli military operation in Rafah and a future Palestinian state, on which Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister says the two sides are close to an agreement in principle, there remains one big problem: 

Riyadh wants America to open the door to a domestic program for uranium enrichment.  

Since the start of the atomic age, however, American policy has discouraged the further spread of these crown jewels of nuclear weapon-making technology. The United States has joined with other nuclear suppliers to oppose such transfers.

Underscoring the risk, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has openly said that Riyadh will obtain nuclear weapons if Iran does, meaning he might eventually pilfer or misappropriate U.S. technology for nuclear weapons. The crown prince refuses to foreswear enrichment, something the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did in 2009 when it committed to what became known as the “gold standard” of nonproliferation. Bin Salman also refuses to sign an enhanced inspection agreement, known as the Additional Protocol, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

And why would he?

The United States granted Iran domestic uranium enrichment under the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), torpedoing prior UN resolutions demanding Tehran cease that practice. UN Iran sanctions remain lifted under UN Resolution 2231, even though no party continues to observe the nuclear deal and Tehran is moving deliberately toward production of weapons-grade uranium.  

Now, some nonproliferation experts are suggesting how Washington might “responsibly” give enrichment technology to the Saudis, even though doing so would likely trigger similar demands or independent efforts by Turkey, Egypt, the UAE and South Korea — suddenly putting multiple countries on the brink of nuclear weapons. One proposal is even stunningly similar to the JCPOA: Restrain Saudi enrichment for 10 years before lifting all restrictions.   

Congress must not be fooled. These proposals, much like the JCPOA, merely kick the can down the road on creating another Middle Eastern state on the cusp of nuclear weapons.  

Thankfully, Congress has a say: It retains a right to condition or disapprove any U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. Thus, while lawmakers may be eager to support the U.S.-Saudi-Israel mega deal, they should block American cooperation that would fuel a future Saudi bomb. Congress should pass bipartisan legislation making its approval of a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement contingent on Riyadh formally ruling out enrichment and reprocessing and signing the Additional Protocol.  

Saudi Arabia may threaten to go to China for enrichment help, but the White House should not buckle. Rather, it should make clear to Riyadh that turning to Beijing would insert a poison pill into the mega deal.  

Whatever Team Biden may offer to help Riyadh build a nuclear program for energy production, it should not include an option to enrich uranium, which is unnecessary to support the kingdom’s aim of producing and exporting nuclear electricity. Washington or its European partners can enrich uranium far more affordably for the Saudis.  

To show it shares Saudi concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, the Biden administration must work with France, Britain and Germany to formally end the nuclear deal, restore UN Iran sanctions, and reinstate the multilateral demand that Iran’s enrichment activity must cease. Doing so would have the added benefit of restoring lapsed UN missile and military embargos against Tehran, which the regime has used to export destruction in the region, Ukraine and beyond. 

In addition, having let Iran sanctions enforcement lapse for three years, Washington must enforce Congress’s new oil, financial, human rights and terrorism sanctions under the recent national security supplemental. 

Meanwhile, Congress should know that if it fails to restrain the administration on Saudi enrichment, the nuclear portion of the mega deal could automatically come into force after 90 legislative days. Congress must make sure a law is in place to prevent the administration from going too far. 

If Sullivan and team can pull it off, the mega deal will be billed as bringing peace to the Middle East. If it opens the door to Saudi enrichment, however, the accord will only fuel more chaos and instability.  

Andrea Stricker is deputy director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program and a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense (1989-1993).