Why Ukraine’s fate may depend on America’s fear of China’s military

Leading senators, including Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), have made it clear that they soon will seek a defense and Ukraine supplemental spending bill for fiscal year 2024. But many members of the far-right House Freedom Caucus beg to differ — they staunchly oppose both an increase in defense spending and more money for Ukraine.

Earlier this week, the Freedom Caucus demonstrated its clout by blocking debate on bills that Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) had planned to bring to the House floor. The 206-220 vote that defeated the procedural House rule and the ability of the Freedom Caucus to block all floor votes for the remainder of the week were unambiguous signals that the Caucus both resented the debt-ceiling agreement that McCarthy had reached with President Biden and would not countenance any add-ons to debt levels that it already considers too high. Yet that is exactly what an emergency supplemental would do.

Just as many Freedom Caucus members, and indeed many progressives on the Democratic left, oppose any increases in defense spending and would rather have seen deeper cuts to the defense budget, they also are increasingly reluctant to vote any more funds to support Ukraine’s effort to roll back Russia’s seizure of its territory.

Earlier this year, Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.), one of the ringleaders in the revolt on the House rule, issued a press release saying that he had “led a group of 11 lawmakers in calling for the United States to halt additional military and financial aid to Ukraine through the introduction of the ‘Ukraine Fatigue’ Resolution.” Since then, the Biden administration has poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Ukraine, only adding to the frustration of Gaetz and his allies.

Speaker McCarthy, recognizing that the Freedom Caucus could create ongoing and serious procedural hurdles in the face of any push for a supplemental, has refused to commit himself to acting on the matter in the near term, saying “if the idea of the supplemental is to go around the agreement we just came to, I think we’ve got to walk through appropriations.”

Since the debt agreement calls for passage of all 12 appropriations bill by Jan. 1, 2024, McCarthy is in no rush to alienate any parts of his caucus. But if the U.S. is to continue to fund Ukraine’s military efforts, Congress would have to pass a defense appropriation by September 30. That may be too soon for McCarthy.

The Speaker could, in theory, rely on the support of House Democrats to push through a Ukraine supplemental, as he did to get approval of the debt-ceiling deal. Doing so would either render him vulnerable to an effort to remove him from the speakership or only allow him to retain his office by becoming a hostage to the Democratic caucus. In that case, he might find himself in the same position as British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, who in the mid-1930s found himself forced not only to rely on Conservative Party votes in Parliament but also, in order to stay in office, to leave the Labour Party that he had led for decades.

Despite what appear to be dim prospects for passage of a defense supplemental, much less one for Ukraine, it still could muster House support if it were framed in terms of the need to deter China rather than support Kyiv. China is one of the few national security issues, perhaps even the only one, that unites the vast majority of members of Congress. House Armed Services Committee chairman Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) has stated that “we will need a supplemental later this year, for China specifically.” There are senior Republican House appropriators who apparently share that view.

A China supplemental could be structured in a manner that, with creative reprogramming by the Defense Department, would win the support of congressional appropriations committees and allow the administration to continue to supply Kyiv with the materiel it will urgently need in order to continue its operations against Russia’s forces.

It is noteworthy that the Biden administration, while articulating the need for ongoing support for Ukraine, has until now been noticeably silent on the matter of advocating for a supplemental that would increase defense spending. The Office of Management and Budget would be certain to oppose it. That is not at all surprising, since the debt agreement essentially ratified the administration’s defense budget request.

Yet given the dynamics playing out in the House, and the likelihood that only through some budgetary legerdemain can Ukraine receive the aid it needs, the administration may find it has little choice but to voice its support for a defense supplemental that not only would underscore America’s commitment to outpacing China’s military, but also to continue its leadership of the international effort to preserve Ukrainian freedom and independence.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.