It’s a mistake to expect China to solve the problem in North Korea

Much has been said of China’s influence over North Korea and its ability to compel Kim Jong Un’s regime towards change. 

China’s historical and cultural ties with the Korean peninsula run deep, and Beijing’s North Korea policy over the last six plus decades is just one example. Through sustained economic and geopolitical support for North Korea since the 1950s, China has demonstrated its strategic interests in ensuring the Kim Dynasty’s survival.

{mosads}As North Korea continues to progress in its quest to weaponize intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads — presenting an increasingly unacceptable security risk to American policymakers — calls for China to reign in North Korea are becoming louder and more frequent.

Yet it bears asking, what concrete steps can China take to change North Korea’s behavior? Also, to what extent is China willing to act, given its national interests? 

Unquestionably, China has considerable economic leverage over North Korea given the North’s dependence on Beijing for its energy and food supplies. Roughly 80 percent of North Korea’s trade is conducted with China. Taking this into consideration, many assert that China can alter North Korea’s actions simply by cutting off commercial ties.

Some contend that China’s civilizational ties to the Korean people, its support for North Korea during the Korean War and its sixty-plus year role as a political, ideological and economic partner give it a moral authority and sway with the Kim regime that other powers just do not have. 

Others claim that China’s rise, prominence and current trajectory towards becoming the world’s next superpower give it more clout with Pyongyang than it ever had before. 

However, it’s time that Washington, Seoul and Tokyo realize that Beijing is willing to live with a Pyongyang that is armed with the capability to carry out nuclear strikes far beyond its shores. Why? Because taking measures to forcibly change North Korea’s conduct runs counter to Beijing’s strategic interests in these ways.

Regime collapse: A heavy hand by Beijing may contribute to the fall of Kim Jong Un’s regime. One consequence of a North Korean government collapse would be a flood of refugees pouring across both countries’ shared border into China, creating an expensive humanitarian nightmare for Beijing. 

Such a scenario may also result in Seoul coming to control the North’s territory, ending North Korea’s role as a buffer state for China. Such a development would be a strategic catastrophe for Beijing as it would bring the entire peninsula under the influence of Washington and, in Beijing’s eyes, threaten its territorial sovereignty.

Instability and loose nukes: Chinese moves to clamp down on North Korea may create instability in Pyongyang’s government and security apparatus, increasing chances of parts of its nuclear arsenal getting into the wrong hands. Such a development would serve as a national security risk to China, particularly if the weapons came into the possession of groups inside China who are hostile to Beijing’s rule, such as pan-Turkish supporters of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and East Turkistan Liberation Organization, among others.

Backlash: Strong efforts by Beijing to curtail Pyongyang may result in the regime lashing out and creating a security or diplomatic crisis. Such tactics have been used by the North in years past for purposes of exacting food, energy and hard currency from other states.

Hostilities: Kim may resort to attacks on the south as a bargaining chip for concessions by Beijing or if he believes that measures taken against him threaten his regime’s existence. This would effectively return Washington and Beijing to a war footing on the peninsula, if not outright armed conflict itself if not handled carefully.

Should Beijing change its mind and conclude that a nuclear strike-capable North Korea is intolerable and against its interests, it has an option that would raise prospects for both changing Pyongyang’s behavior and attaining peace in the region: becoming the North’s security guarantor.

China could negotiate an agreement where it provides for North Korea’s security — guaranteeing Pyongyang protection with its nuclear arsenal — thereby creating the conditions for the North to relinquish its nuclear program.

It should be noted that some assert this prospect is without merit, arguing that North Korea’s ultimate aim is to vanquish the South and unite the peninsula under the Kim regime’s rule.

These considerations aside, it is improbable at best that Beijing will see it in its interests to oblige Mr. Kim to change course.

Ted Gover, Ph.D., is an instructor of political science at Central Texas College, Camp Pendleton, Calif.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.