President Trump’s quasi endorsement of populist Marine Le Pen for the French presidency, though utterly inappropriate from a diplomatic perspective, was hardly a surprise. In fairness, though, President Obama opened the way to such interventions in the domestic politics of allied countries last fall. He invited then-Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi to Washington for a state visit and showered Renzi with praise, right in the middle of an Italian referendum campaign on which the Italian leader had staked his political career.
At least Renzi was undeniably a good friend and partner of the United States, while Le Pen’s Front National (FN) is partial to posting creepy images of Uncle Sam festooned with Stars of David, and attacks mainstream French politicians as servants of the U.S. who fail to defend French national interests against U.S. threats. (The White House staff must have missed that side of Le Pen and her supporters.)
{mosads}Interestingly, though, neither Obama’s nor Trump’s endorsement carried much weight with European voters. Renzi lost his referendum on Italian constitutional changes and resigned as prime minister. Le Pen as well did not profit from White House praise, not that one really should have expected any boost. Also, the dire predictions that the terrorist killing of French police officer on the Champs-Elysées would throw French voters into Le Pen’s arms proved incorrect. With 97 percent of votes officially tallied, Le Pen’s share was 21.43 percent. This was in line with the 22 percent the last pre-election polls, including polls from before the Champs-Elysées shooting, had suggested she would pull.
In fact, for all the garment rending regarding the Le Pen threat, she did not do all that well in the first round of presidential balloting. True, she did make it into the May 7 run-off against centrist Emmanuel Macron (who received 23.86 percent of first-round votes). But this is not an unprecedented feat for the Le Pen family. Marine’s father Jean-Marie, founder of the Front National, made it into the 2002 presidential run-off (only to be trounced by Gaullist Jacques Chirac). Five years ago, Marine was just shy of 18 percent in the first round. But the additional 3.5 percent this time should be a disappointment to her.
In the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, for example, FN was the leading party, with almost 25 percent of the vote. In the December 2015 regional elections, FN was again the top party (in the first round of balloting) with almost 28 percent. In sum, the percentage of French voters for whom the Front National is the first choice has, if anything, declined recently, despite events that seemed to promise a great future for populists, e.g. the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Before declaring victory, however, Le Pen’s critics should remember that, in the May 7 presidential run-off, we have to see how many French voters can accept Le Pen as their second choice. It remains unclear. While initial polls suggest a solid victory for Macron in the second round one should be cautious about polling data in such an unprecedented situation, in which neither of the two major parties, the center-right Gaullist Républicains or the Socialists, with their impressive party machines, are in the running.
As James Traub elegantly described in Foreign Policy online, Le Pen has a great deal in common with leftist populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon when it comes to economic policy. Both are advocates of a nationalized, statist economy, and opponents of free trade and labor market flexibility. In turn, the Gaullist presidential candidate, François Fillon, though a relative liberal on economic matters, is close to Le Pen on issues of national identity and immigration. While Fillon quickly declared he would vote for Macron in the presidential run-off, it is not clear how many of his supporters can accept the socially liberal Macron as their second choice.
Although it is a catastrophic scenario, and seems unlikely, a dramatic shift of Mélenchon’s 19.62 percent and Fillon’s 19.94 percent to Le Pen on May 7 would put her into the Presidential Palace.
Simply stated, this would not be a good thing for the United States, just as it would not be a good thing for our other friends and allies in Europe. But the extent of the damage would be clear only after the legislative elections in France, also in two rounds, June 11 and 18. The French voting system would make it difficult for the Front National to win a large number of seats, because it would have a hard time mustering the requisite majority in most of the 577 separate electoral districts. It is hard to speculate at this point what sort of government might emerge from the new parliament, and how effectively a President Le Pen could work with a new prime minister and cabinet. But we should not get ahead of ourselves. The presidential run-off is still hard enough to call.
In that interim period, the White House and all other U.S. official representatives should avoid commenting on French domestic politics. Judging from recent experiences, U.S. endorsements are unlikely to produce the intended effects. Indeed, there is a risk that perceived U.S. interventions in France’s internal affairs could backfire. The appropriate time for official statements is after elections.
In any case, France is experiencing the same disillusionment and frustration we are seeing in other Western societies. The first-round presidential balloting was a clear indication. Over 40 percent of voters opted for parties outside the traditional mainstream of French politics, and even the Socialist candidate (who got a meager 6.35 percent) represented the far left wing of the party. For that matter, Macron’s success reflected the unhappiness of moderate voters with the customary Gaullist/Socialist alternative.
To some extent, though, the first round always has been the opportunity for the French to vote with their hearts, before voting with their heads in the second round. We should hope that the heads, preferably cool ones, prevail once again on May 7.
Eric R. Terzuolo’s assignments as a Foreign Service Officer included a tour of duty at the US Embassy in Paris. Since 2010, he has been on contract to the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute, responsible for West European area studies.
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