Mission creep in the Middle East

Here we go again.

After removing all troops from Iraq and slimming down to under 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, the United States has pursued a drone-and-airstrike campaign in both combat zones — but the idea that cutting off the heads of bad organizations will make a difference doesn’t work. We might slow things temporarily, but, like the Hydra of Greek mythology, more heads always grow. Airstrikes that inflict pinprick damage to enemy forces are inadequate to impede their progress.

{mosads}The result: A president who promised not to introduce more American troops into the Iraq-Syria theater is trapped among the realities of a bad military situation, unruly allies, rampaging Russians, a hostile Congress, an ineffective national security team and an American public sick of the whole mess. The solution: Send in 50 special operations forces (SOF). Forget that it’s only 50. The president has broken his word, and it would be hard to think of a response that threatens horrible outcomes while providing few likely upsides. Where to start?

The special operations forces are supposed to work with our only reliable battlefield allies, Syrian Kurds, and provide training, more efficient resupply and improved targeting for airstrikes. The problem is that Turkey opposes the Syrian Kurds, so we are helping an opponent of a NATO ally. It is a major reason why the Turks have been reluctant allies, and why Turkey waited to allow us to use one of its airfields.

Next is the issue of Syria’s president, Bashar Assad. Turkey desperately wants him out. So-called moderate Syrians want him out. The Russians want him in. We are now suggesting that we, who have reviled Assad incessantly for bombing and gassing civilians, would be willing to live with Assad during a transition process to field a new leader. The mechanism is unclear. Where do 50 troops fit into this equation?

What about the training? The Kurds are real fighters and good enough. What they need most are weapons and other supplies. If the special operations forces abet this process, that would be great, but are special operations forces the only ones who can manage this? The CIA is already on the ground and has long experience with managing military supplies. Why violate a promise just for this?

As for training anyone else, we can’t. It just never works out. Whatever the cause, we have failed to leave behind winning organizations in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The reasons can be argued ad nauseum, but the reality is what it is. The Afghan army cannot decisively beat the Taliban, and the Iraqi army has failed in Iraq. We didn’t change this with tens of thousands of troops, and we’re not going to fix it with 50 special operations forces.

Then there’s the biggest downside of all. As has happened recently, some of these troops could be left in the position of having to fight alongside the Kurds, and someone might be killed. Even more horrible is the specter of someone being captured. While sending 50 special operations forces is wrong, who would argue against sending 1,000 to rescue a captured American? Why do we need to be put in this position? And how can we be sure that the Russians won’t manage to accidentally kill one of our people? What do we do then?

The problem is not the lack of 50 special operations forces. Our policy is incoherent. We want Assad out; we’ll live with him for a while. We want the Russians out; we can’t really do anything about it. We want the Iranians out; they’re staying. We want Iraq united; we can’t make it happen. We need Turkish help; they do as they please. The idea of the United States leading from the front is ludicrous when we have lost our way, and do not have the ability to predict how events will unfold with or without our meddling.

If Russia is there to protect Assad, it will have to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sooner or later. Iran and its surrogates are already fighting ISIS. Turkey is beginning to press ISIS even as it spars with the Kurds. As for Assad, after unseating Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and watching that country sink into failure, who’s to say that what would follow in Syria wouldn’t be worse? And no one has addressed what we would do if the Sunnis win in Syria and start to systematically slaughter Assad’s Alawite sect.

The answer is not to risk 50 special operations forces. Why not let the situation play out until we get a little clarity? We should marshal our sequester-restricted resources, refit our forces and only break promises when we see an attainable solution that makes sense. Now is not that time.

Blady, M.D., is a former program officer for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and senior analyst for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.