Ukraine, Taiwan and the credibility dilemma

What does the Ukraine crisis imply about the United States’s role in the world? “Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan emboldened Russia on Ukraine,” growled one irate critic. “China, Taiwan Closely watching Ukraine,” proclaimed a recent New York Times headline. Listening to the chattering class, you’d think U.S. credibility is linked to whatever happens just about anywhere. But is it?

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grievances on Ukraine are longstanding, beginning with the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and NATO’s subsequent expansion eastward. While Taiwan is understandably always anxiously watching U.S. behavior, the U.S. has had no security relationship to Ukraine — one reason why President Biden ruled out sending U.S. troops to fight Russia. In contrast, the U.S. has security ties to Taiwan going back 70 years, intensifying now with U.S.-China strategic competition. For both the U.S. and China, Taiwan is on a separate track from Ukraine.

Nonetheless, worrying about U.S. credibility abroad is a timeworn favorite pastime for foreign policy wonks. But all credibility is not equal, especially in a complex multipolar world. U.S. commitments abroad are a function of national interests, some more important, and some more enduring, than others.

After 20 years of war, conceding the reality that it was unwinnable and that the U.S.-backed government in Kabul was not viable is not necessarily a sign of U.S. weakened commitments anywhere else. Other than combatting-terrorism, Afghanistan itself was never a U.S. vital interest.

Indeed, notwithstanding how horribly it was executed, one could interpret the Afghan exit as a move to end some U.S. legacy commitments and strengthen them elsewhere, particularly the Indo-Pacific. Since the empress of China sailed into Canton (now Guangzhou) harbor in 1784, U.S. interests have been consistent: freedom of navigation; commercial access; and opposing hegemonic forces.

Globally, since World War II, prevention of any hegemonic power or forces controlling the Eurasian landmass has been at the heart of U.S. commitments. The network of alliances and partners in East Asia reflects that logic.

In his recent book “A Strategy of Denial,” Elbridge Colby uses the term “differentiated credibility,” as opposed to undifferentiated credibility — assuming that how the U.S. acts anywhere is how it will behave in all circumstances.

Thus, nations can perceive a hierarchy of U.S. interests in gauging U.S. commitments. Biden’s response to Putin’s manufactured Ukraine crisis, mobilizing NATO allies, reflects the Western end of the Eurasia. The White House’s recent Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the latest iteration reaffirming the U.S. as a Pacific power, makes clear that the region tops the list of U.S. interests.

The debate over U.S. commitments to Europe versus those in the Indo-Pacific is legitimate, if overwrought. The European Union, with a $17 trillion-plus GDP, rivaling China for the world’s second largest, and $225 billion overall defense spending, punches well below its weight. Despite U.S. urging over the past 30 years, NATO is still lopsidedly dependent on U.S. capabilities. So, arguing that the weight of security challenges has shifted to the Pacific and that the Europeans should bear more of the burden in their region is a reasonable and necessary U.S. argument.

Angst about eroding U.S. credibility seems to come in cycles. After the ignominious U.S. retreat from Vietnam in 1975, conventional wisdom was that the U.S. was done in Asia if not globally.

In the 1980s, fear of being surpassed by Japan was said to be a sign of decline. In the Trump years, it seemed to many that the U.S. was turning its back on the world. The U.S. pivot to Asia has prompted many in Europe to worry about the future of the Trans-Atlantic relationship.

Yet here we are. One problem with drawing conclusions from the Ukraine crisis is that there is an asymmetry of interests. To Putin, Ukraine is a vital interest, part of Mother Russia; to the U.S., it is important but not vital, and not an existential threat. Putin’s overreach, however, has had the exact opposite effect than he intended: It has breathed new life into NATO; reinforced the U.S. leadership role; animated Ukrainian western-leaning nationalism; and spiked Euro-skepticism of Moscow.

Perceptions of U.S. credibility ebb and flow. But the underlying reality is that the U.S. remains a preponderant economic and military power. The U.S. accounts for roughly 24 percent of the global economy, is a leading technology innovator, and the dollar is unrivaled as the world’s premier global currency.

The U.S. has an unrivaled military and force projection capability and an unprecedented global network of allies and partners. One reason there is a proliferation of “grey zone” activity – actions short of war below the threshold of a U.S. response whether in the South China Sea, Iran in the Gulf or Putin’s cyber hacking – is precisely because no one wants to take on the U.S. military directly.

But in a world where wealth and power are increasingly diffused, neither military strength nor economic weight often translate into usable power — the ability to yield desired outcomes. As the Ukraine crisis shows, the U.S. ability to assemble coalitions is a key force multiplier. But at the same time, it requires more sharing of burdens and responsibilities — no easy task.

The pushes and pulls on the U.S. as a global security provider and the limits of U.S. power will always raise credibility concerns. But at present, probably the biggest source of doubt about U.S. credibility is our own domestic malaise. From afar, the Jan.6^. insurrection, political dysfunction and deep tribal polarization, constant school shootings and low COVID-19 vaccination rates among Western nations all sow doubt about U.S. reliability. Repairing the U.S. social and political fabric would do wonders for U.S. credibility.      

Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He was a senior counselor to the undersecretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2004, a member of the U.S. Department of State policy planning staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council strategic futures group from 2008 to 2012. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.