Four critical questions on Afghanistan the Biden administration must answer

It is the hallmark of democracy to question our government officials. Our public servants (I was one for 26 years at the CIA) ultimately work for the American people. Accountability must be the foundation of government work.  

Having worked in conflict environments for many years — and in particular, having served in Afghanistan as an operations officer and then a chief of base — I have several questions about the recent non-combatant evacuation operation at Hamid Karzai International airport.  The Biden administration has touted this as a great success. Until the following questions are answered, however, I believe we need to reserve judgment.  

And, these questions must be presented in a proper forum, to include congressional investigations and after-action reviews by the Pentagon and the Department of State. If mistakes were made, we must take ownership and acknowledge them. If, on the other hand, difficult calls turn out to be just, we must study these as well; they offer historic lessons for future national security practitioners.  

First, why was the Abbey gate left open with a suicide bomber on the loose? In my experience, in the rare event that we obtained such tactical intelligence that indicated an imminent threat to a U.S. government facility such as an embassy or consulate, immediate force-protection measures would be in place that would bar any and all access to outsiders. Yet, an article in Politico suggested that the British somehow were responsible for requesting to keep the gate open, because they were running an evacuation operation nearby.

Such scapegoating of an ally does not excuse the U.S. military commanders on the scene who knew that a major threat was out there but did not, as reported, take timely security measures.  Was there political pressure from Washington that influenced their decision-making? Thirteen Americans died and 20 Americans were among those injured. Must they have been in such a vulnerable position? It is entirely fair to ask this question given the gravity of what occurred.   

Second, where is the full motion video of the drone strike that purportedly killed an Islamic State suicide bomber, but caused the death of 10 Afghan civilians? Ordinarily, during pre-strike calculations, Air Force targeters will determine the circular error of probability (the measure of the precision of the weapon) and collateral damage estimates of the blast, and if the intelligence indicated that a terrorist was potentially carrying explosives, this would be taken into account as well. Initially, the Pentagon claimed that two Islamic State operatives were killed and secondary explosions were evident, but this now has changed to a single Islamic State “facilitator.” 

Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently commented that it was “reasonable” to assess that there were secondary explosions. The story quite simply appears to be evolving. Why? In my view, the American people need to see the full motion video footage, and then learn of the reflections from post-strike intelligence that would indicate whether the strike was successful or not. That this strike killed civilians is disturbing, and so a full account of what occurred is required. 

Third, who in the administration assessed that the U.S. has significant leverage over the Taliban, in terms of our ability to influence them to allow Americans and perhaps special immigrant visa applicants to finally depart Afghanistan? The administration repeatedly touts this alleged leverage, giving fodder to the idea that the Aug. 31 withdrawal date was acceptable given the Taliban’s assurances to help us after we had departed. However, with the reported historic skepticism in the intelligence community about the Taliban, did the CIA and others truly state this in a formal assessment?  

To me, this appears to be the personal influence of the U.S. government’s Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who reportedly held a much rosier view that a “Taliban 2.0” could emerge. In my circle of retired Afghan hands, some with multiple tours under their belts, there is not one of us who believes the Taliban has changed, nor that the U.S. ever will have leverage to get them to do so. 

Fourth, does anyone know who and how many we evacuated? I never have seen such confusion on a foreign policy issue in my lifetime; the numbers that the administration put forth were confusing — and at times contradicted by others in government only hours later. Why does this matter? We have a moral responsibility to evacuate all of the Americans in Afghanistan and our Afghan allies. The Department of Defense and White House staff seemingly every hour on the hour throw additional numbers at us, with more than 100,000 people now having departed, many of them ultimately designated to live in America.  

Yet, a State Department official said on Sept. 1 that a large majority of our allies, including most special immigrant visa applicants, actually were left behind. That is an inexcusable tragedy. Does this alter the “great success” narrative that the administration has parroted? 

The rank-and-file men and women of the State Department, intelligence community and Department of Defense worked tirelessly on the evacuation operation in near-impossible conditions, and we must commend them for their herculean efforts under incredible pressure and duress. I am inspired by the words of a C-17 pilot who flew multiple missions, literally saving the lives of hundreds of Afghans: “To over 100,000 people of Afghanistan, the C-17 became a vessel of hope and freedom.” 

But this does not absolve senior U.S. government officials from being accountable to the American people, given the chaos that occurred, the loss of U.S. lives, and the abandonment of our Afghan allies. The answers to the four questions posed above are imperative to fully understanding what occurred prior to and during the evacuation, ultimately to ensure strict accountability, reward achievements and allow us to close this chapter of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.

Marc Polymeropoulos served for 26 years at CIA and retired from the Senior Intelligence Service in 2019. He is the author of “Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA.” Follow him on Twitter @Mpolymer.