NATO’s newest allies offer valuable lessons in preparedness

The 32 members of the NATO alliance arrived in Washington this week for a critical summit. 

Against the backdrop of D.C.’s oppressive heat and humidity, the member-states discussed the ongoing war against Ukraine, the long-term threat from Russia, defense planning and spending, and what role, if any, the alliance will have in the Indo-Pacific. 

To say it was a full agenda is an understatement.

The summit also saw, for the first time, all 32 members convening. The accession of both Finland and Sweden to the alliance expands the defensive bloc and brings with it significant defense and security capabilities.

Both countries are net contributors to the alliance, bringing with them robust military capabilities. Beyond just the raw military power of both countries, Sweden and Finland offer critical lessons for the rest of NATO about how to mobilize societies for preparedness.

For Sweden, total defense means “the ability to defend Sweden against an armed attack and safeguard our security, freedom, independence and freedom of action.” Finland has a similar approach, looking at total defense as “the mobilization of the entire society for the potential purpose of war.” 

For both countries, this means preparing the government, military, civil institutions and the public — the whole of society — for the potential of conflict. 

Individuals and businesses are expected to have plans to survive the initial, opening stages of a conflict or disaster, acting as a bridge between an incident’s occurrence and the delivery of aid and support from the central government. Buildings are expected to have shelters for residents in the event of an aerial attack. Industries are required to have a measure of depth for stockpiles and supplies in the event of disruption.

While the planning efforts are clearly directed at the threat of war, each of these measures — individually and in aggregate — make for a more robust and resilient society, a more prepared society for the panoply of challenges.

The U.S. had similar levels of preparedness during the Cold War as part of its Civil Defense program. Although far from the concept of “total defense,” we were, as a country, far better prepared for the possibility of conflict and its impacts, whether on Main Street or in the heartland. Thankfully, the Cold War ended without any of those plans being tested with any intensity. 

Over the years, despite stress-tests in the form of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and multiple significant disasters, our national preparedness efforts lagged far behind where they should have been. The pandemic was the first real test of our preparedness efforts and our ability as a country to weather the storm. In many ways, we were found wanting.

Preparedness is neither a four-letter word nor a luxury. It is an investment in the country’s ability to weather and survive a significant crisis. It is like an insurance policy against what are, ultimately, inevitable crises. 

As Sweden and Finland demonstrate, it must be a whole of society effort. Leadership needs to come from the top, from the federal government and Congress. Executive and legislative leadership is needed to set standards, allocate resources and do what the government does best — chart the direction of the country and fill any gaps in the country’s planning. 

For example, when it comes to pharmaceutical and vaccine development, there simply isn’t a commercial market for these products. The government needs to place the orders and provide the industry with the confidence that the demand will be present. 

The Strategic National Stockpile is vital to rapidly surge resources to areas of crisis, but it requires regular refreshment, modernization and sustained investment to meet emergent challenges.

At the next level down, coordination between state, county and municipal officials is needed to ensure that community needs are met and plans are in place for when a crisis occurs. Gaps at this level require federal government intervention — states cannot do everything nor should they be expected to do so. 

At family and individual levels, the Swedes and Finns have it right. There is a base expectation that the smallest units will have resources available for a finite period, during which state and federal officials can step in and initiate response plans.

Thankfully the U.S. is not at risk from foreign invasion, but total defense isn’t just about military response. The risks of terrorism or hostile nation-state actions (like biological or chemical attacks), pandemic disease — whether man-made or natural — and natural disasters are nonetheless all very real. 

They have happened before and they will happen again, yet we have a sense of collective amnesia. After each incident, there is a wish that we had been better prepared, yet we go on about business as usual.

NATO coming to Washington D.C. was an opportune time for the White House and Congress to borrow a page from Sweden and Finland and look at preparedness not as a luxury or something distinct from national security. Preparedness is national security; preparedness is part of American total defense. 

Reframing it like our Scandinavian partners will help shift our thinking and help drive substantive change in the way we prepare for the inevitable.

Joshua C. Huminski is senior vice president for National Security and Intelligence Programs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress and a George Mason University National Security Institute senior fellow.