Netanyahu needs to speak truth on Saudi nuclear deal

Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu let it be known through his advisors that he could support President Biden‘s cease-fire agreement with Hamas in principle while reserving the right to clarify certain details. Netanyahu has since been vocal about his reservations concerning the permanence of any cease fire and his unwillingness to hand over any authority to Hamas to run Gaza.

What he and his advisors have been mum about, however, are the ramifications of another aspect of Biden’s Middle East bargain: encouraging the Saudis to normalize relations with Israel by offering to help Saudi Arabia produce nuclear power and enrich uranium.

Enriching uranium is a proliferation red flag. It’s the process that brought Iran to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. Netanyahu would do well to clarify his thinking on this nuclear bit before he addresses Congress on July 24.

In fact, Biden’s nuclear generosity toward Saudi Arabia runs the risk of not just creating a Saudi nuclear weapons option, but of prompting Saudi Arabia‘s neighbors — the United Arab Emirates and Turkey — to demand similar treatment.

It’s not well known, but the UAE’s nuclear cooperative agreement with the U.S. specifies that if another nation in the region strikes a nuclear agreement with Washington with more generous terms, the UAE reserves the right to reopen negotiations to secure similar terms. As such, offering to help Saudi Arabia enrich uranium on its soil risks catalyzing a nuclear competition in the Middle East that would make Iran getting a bomb look relatively manageable.  

Meanwhile, South Korea has long demanded that its current nuclear cooperative agreement with Washington be amended to allow for uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling. Washington, though, has rightly been wary: Seoul has engaged in covert nuclear weapons activities more than once. The last thing the United States wants is a repeat performance. Should South Korea get nuclear weapons, Japan would likely follow suit, introducing major uncertainties in an already tense security alliance triangle.

Biden’s diplomats deflect these grim prospects with elaborate operating conditions that optimists might think can prevent the Saudis from using U.S. nuclear energy assistance for nefarious purposes. However, possession — actually having a uranium enrichment plant operating on Saudi soil — is 90 percent of the law.

Even if (as proposed) such a plant is run by Americans, Saudi Arabia can seize it as their own whenever they wish. More important, once they begin enriching, it will be extremely difficult for outside intelligence agencies to know what illicit nuclear activities they might be conducting away from the declared site. 

This is precisely what happened in Iran. Once the mullahs began construction of their internationally inspected “peaceful” nuclear power plant at Bushier, they used it as an acquisition front to get all of the other bits and pieces they needed to secretly enrich uranium and test various parts of their weapons design. 

By the time Western intelligence agencies uncovered this buying spree, it was too late — they had the goods. One might hope that Western intelligence would do better in Saudi Arabia. But so far, it hasn’t. Instead, Saudi Arabia secretly acquired at least two types of nuclear capable missiles, a missile factory and the basics for mining and processing uranium from China. Western intelligence was able to confirm this, but only after the fact.

Why does this matter? Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salma Al Saud (MBS) who runs the kingdom, has repeatedly said if he thinks Iran has acquired a nuclear weapon, he will violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and get one as well. 

Those in the know in Washington understand this. Five years ago, Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) argued that Iran and its Arab neighbors had no need to enrich or reprocess and should stay clear of such activities. More recently, 20 Senate Democrats wrote President Biden taking the same position.

Administration officials have yet to brief anyone in Congress on the deal’s details. That has prompted some to act. Last week, Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed legislation that would block U.S. nuclear transfers to the kingdom if the Saudis began enriching uranium or recycling plutonium. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) is expected to propose similar legislation.

Meanwhile, Republicans, including Donald Trump) have kept mum about Biden’s nuclear offer. What’s allowed them this luxury is Israel’s official silence.

In 2018, Netanyahu opposed U.S. nuclear assistance to Saudi Arabia. More recently, he denied pressuring his nuclear experts to support Washington helping MBS enrich uranium on Saudi soil. The concerns they shared with him are quite real.

We can only hope that before he speaks before Congress July 24, Mr. Netanyahu will be as candid and specific on the nuclear portion of the Biden deal as he has been about the rest of it. More than just reaching an immediate peace in the Middle East depends on getting this right.

Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, Va. and served as the Pentagon’s deputy for Nonproliferation Policy (1989-93).