With fresh US funding, Ukraine must not repeat 2023’s mistakes

After months of delay amid a worsening strategic situation, the long-awaited U.S. military aid is on its way to Kyiv.  

To survive, Ukraine must use that aid wisely. 

By a vote of 311 to 112, the House of Representatives passed a $95 billion aid bill containing $61 billion for Ukraine. The Senate passed it by a vote of 79 to 18, and President Biden signed it into law. 

While this assistance will enable the Ukrainians to halt the Russian advance and perhaps reverse some of its recent gains, it will not enable them to recapture vast tracks of the east and south occupied in 2022. 

Last summer, the Ukrainian military squandered much of its resources and many of its soldiers in a fruitless offensive. 

The Russian army, which proved incapable of sustaining deep advances into Ukraine in 2022, has proven more adept at defensive warfare.  

Dug in behind fortified lines several miles deep, protected by minefields backed by artillery and supported by helicopters, it inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. 

The first few weeks of the much-anticipated offensive saw 20 percent of Ukraine’s equipment destroyed or damaged. One mechanized brigade trained by the West lost 28 of its 99 Bradley fighting vehicles to damage, abandonment or destruction. 

Unable to sustain such losses, the Ukrainians scaled back the offensive and settled for modest, local gains.  

By the time the offensive ended in late fall, Ukrainian forces had lost thousands of soldiers and billions of dollars in equipment to liberate approximately 200 square miles. 

Ukrainian mistakes compounded the effectiveness of Russian defensive tactics. Instead of concentrating its forces on a single thrust in the south, Kyiv divided them between the southern drive toward Mariupol and an eastern push toward Bakhmut, diminishing the likelihood of success in either area. 

The Ukrainians also deployed their newest recruits to lead the assault. Although some of these troops were trained and equipped with NATO-supplied weapons, including Abrams and Leopard tanks, they lacked combat experience and faired poorly against battle-hardened Russian units. 

The 2023 offensive not only achieved little, but it also depleted munitions stocks, especially artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles. 

After being badly mauled by Russian forces, Ukrainians suffered at the hands of far-right American politicians. 

Led by the “Freedom Caucus,” the Republican majority in the House blocked Ukraine aid for six months. 

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) blamed the delay on Tucker Carlson demonizing Ukraine and Donald Trump who “didn’t seem to want us to do anything at all.” 

The situation only changed when President Biden directed his staff to provide House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) with detailed intelligence briefings on the dire situation in Ukraine. That information and a promise by House Democrats to help Johnson keep his job pushed him off the fence. 

He got the aid bill through with more Democratic than Republican votes.  

However, Republicans have vowed that this maneuver will not work again. 

“If Ukraine thinks that it’s getting another $60 billion supplemental out of the United States Congress, there’s no way,” Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) declared.  

The current aid package should keep the Ukrainian military adequately supplied through the remainder of the year, but further funding may depend on the outcome of the 2024 election. That uncertainty provides an additional incentive for Ukraine to husband its resources. 

The Pentagon has revealed an impressive list of weapons in the aid package, including badly needed artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, small arms and ammunition, Bradly fighting vehicles and ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS).  

Most of these weapons are best suited for the kind of defensive warfare Ukraine needs to fight. 

The U.S. is also supplying Kyiv with the long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) capable of hitting targets 190 miles away. This weapon will enable the Ukrainian military to hit airfields and logistics hubs behind Russian lines. 

Conspicuously absent from the list are Abrams Tanks. Of the 31 M1A1 battle tanks the U.S. provided to Ukraine in January 2023, five have been destroyed and the rest were withdrawn because they have proven vulnerable to Russian drones, which the Ukrainians have been unable to shoot down for lack of appropriate weapons. The Ukrainians have also failed to employ a “combined arms approach” (coordinating infantry, artillery, armor and air assets) that might have allowed them to use the tanks more effectively. 

However, battlefield conditions may not be conducive to the maneuver warfare U.S. forces train for and want to teach the Ukrainian military. 

Shortage of weapons and tactics are not Ukraine’s only challenges. Now that the conflict has become a war of attrition, Russia’s far greater population is tipping the balance in its favor. The Ukrainian military is struggling to fill its depleted ranks. 

A new conscription law has improved the registration of eligible men and lowered the recruitment age to 25, but draft dodging remains a serious problem in a country with a history of corruption.  

All of these factors indicate that Ukraine should concentrate on holding the territory it controls rather than trying to liberate what it has lost.  

It needs time to rebuild its badly damaged energy infrastructure and continue training and equipping its military. 

Ukraine may be able to reverse some Russian gains made over the last few months, but it cannot afford another all-out offensive. Sustaining losses on the scale of last year could be fatal, especially with no guarantee of further U.S. funding to replace them. 

The U.S. and its NATO allies have two important tasks in the months and years ahead. First, analysts and politicians must stop encouraging Ukraine to believe it can defeat Russia and recapture all of its territory. Second, the West must continue to supply Ukraine with military aid. 

Without that support, all the money spent and the lives lost will be for nothing. 

Tom Mockaitis is a professor of history at DePaul University and author of “Conventional and Unconventional War: A History of Conflict in the Modern World.”