Tightening Syria sanctions will only heighten civilian suffering 

Nearly 10,000 Syrians have died as a result of the 7.8 magnitude earthquake that struck the Turkey-Syria border area in February. As tragic as that figure is, the toll might have been even higher if the Biden administration had not — after significant public outcry — issued a license exempting certain humanitarian activity from the threat of economic sanctions. 

The decision was a clear recognition that U.S. sanctions against Syria, expanded to an unprecedented level under the 2019 Caesar Act, can significantly harm ordinary civilians in that war-torn country. But whatever limited breathing room the license may have temporarily provided, it, and much more, is now at risk. 

A new bill from Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) prohibiting the normalization of relations with the Bashar al-Assad government also aims to significantly tighten economic sanctions on Syria. In addition to extending the Caesar Act’s sunset from 2024 to 2032, the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act (HR 3202) expands the list of sanctioned activities and entities, requires the president to respond to congressional sanctions requests, and requires the use of the “full range of authorities,” including sanctions, to “deter reconstruction activities in any areas under the control of Bashar al-Assad.” 

Reasonable people may have different positions regarding whether and how the United States government should relate to Assad. What we do know with near-certainty is that intensifying economic sanctions will impede reconstruction from the earthquake and years of war, and heighten the suffering of the Syrian people. 

In a recent report for the Center for Economic and Policy Research, I conducted a comprehensive review of the econometric literature on the impacts of economic sanctions on various measures of civilian well-being. Of the 32 studies available — nearly all peer-reviewed — 30 found that sanctions caused substantial harm to the populations of targeted nations, including by worsening poverty, inequality, and human rights.

One study associated multilateral sanctions with an average collapse in per capita GDP equivalent to that of the Great Depression. Another found that multilateral sanctions were associated with a drop in female life expectancy comparable to that of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the effects observed were similar to those found during war.  

Nine out of 10 Syrians are currently living in poverty. Food prices have risen 800 percent in two years, leaving 12.1 million people food insecure. The Syrian pound recently hit an all-time low. Amid inflation, depreciation, and shortages of fuel and medicine, the UN Special Envoy for Syria reported late last year that “the needs of the Syrian people have reached the worst levels since the conflict began.” 

It is, of course, difficult to disentangle how much of this particular humanitarian disaster is driven by sanctions rather than the fallout of the war or the mismanagement and corruption of the Assad government. This lack of smoking-gun data is often used as a justification for the continuation of sanctions. But the overwhelming economic evidence on how sanctions impact targeted economies leaves little doubt that they have significantly exacerbated Syria’s situation. A recent Carter Center study stated that comprehensive sanctions had “disastrous direct and indirect impacts on Syria’s economy and its population at large”, while a UN human rights expert concluded that the multiple sanctions imposed on Syria’s economy have had a devastating effect on nearly all categories of human rights.

As is often the case, these profound human costs have come with little evident benefits. Sanctions rarely succeed at altering the behavior of targeted governments, particularly those that are unaccountable to their citizens. In fact, some evidence indicates that sanctions are associated with a deterioration rather than an amelioration of democracy. Twelve years of war and economic isolation have failed to unseat Assad. If this is, indeed, the goal of the bills’ authors, it is difficult to see how tightening the noose on the Syrian people would do so now at a time when the government appears to be consolidating control and turning to reconstruction. 

U.S. policymakers are free to debate whether or not to normalize relations with Assad, and how we should react when other nations do so. But when they consider whether or not to vote for HR 3202, members of Congress need to be aware that the bill will further punish millions of innocent Syrians. The Biden administration should be lifting economic sanctions on Syria, not imposing new ones. The people of Syria have suffered enough. 

Francisco Rodríguez is the Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.