To compete with China, the US must embrace multilateral diplomacy

Despite bellicose statements and increasing military investments by both sides, the most active front lines for the U.S. and China run through conference rooms across the globe, not the Taiwan Strait.

What is at stake is fundamental to U.S. interests. It will determine whether the rules-based international order the U.S. and its allies assembled after World War II will continue or be displaced by one reflecting China’s domestic governance and international interests — a global order where autocratic norms displace liberal norms such as human rights and free elections.   

Those working the front lines between the U.S. and China are diplomats, not soldiers, and the competition involves multilateral diplomacy related to the various international and regional organizations and the norms that, together, make up the international order.

For much of the 21st century, China has paid more attention to multilateral diplomacy than has the U.S. While the U.S. has talked about a “pivot to Asia,” China has been pivoting to the world. 

At the Chinese Communist Party’s 2014 Foreign Policy Work Conference, President Xi Jinping noted an impending struggle for the future of the international order. At the 2018 conference, Xi called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system.”

Xi’s words produced action. China has become the second-largest contributor across the multilateral development banks and the fifth-largest overall to the United Nations’s regular budget and for U.N. peacekeeping operations. In 2021, Chinese nationals headed four of the principal 15 U.N. agencies. China has also become active in organizations dealing with issues far from Asia, such as the Arctic Council.

Additionally, China has launched three multilateral development institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which a number of U.S. allies joined over U.S. objections. Xi has expanded membership in the security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization beyond Russia and Central Asia to include India and Pakistan as members and Saudi Arabia and Iran as dialogue partners. China has also launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. The expansion of the BRI’s and the AIIB’s lending and development activities into Africa and Latin America, as well as Europe, demonstrate China’s goals are global, not regional.

These are the kind of actions on which the U.S. once had a near monopoly.

Still, the U.S. remains the leading global power. It is the largest contributor to most international institutions to which it belongs and holds more senior positions in international organizations than China. Russia’s war on Ukraine has showcased America’s unparalleled ability to galvanize global resources and action, but it has also highlighted how the world has changed. Most of America’s traditional allies have supported Ukraine, but many other increasingly important states have, like China, neither condemned nor condoned Russia’s invasion.  

Past U.S. diplomatic inattention and missteps have created multilateral opportunities for China.

The U.S. has traditionally prioritized bilateral diplomacy between two countries over multilateral diplomacy. This is reflected in arrearages of U.S. payments to the U.N., as well as its history of quitting international organizations and agreements. During the Trump administration, for example, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (a U.S. initiative to maintain power over China), UNESCO, the Iran nuclear agreement, the U.N. Human Rights Council and announced its intention to quit the World Health Organization.  

Walking out of multilateral organizations and agreements is self-defeating for the U.S. when China is looking for opportunities to displace it internationally. And treating multilateral diplomacy as a second-tier priority is counterproductive when rising regional powers, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa recognize their agency on global issues and need to be engaged to be convinced. 

The U.S. cannot advance its national security interests in the coming decades by going it alone or collaborating only with close allies. Instead, the U.S. must prioritize working with and through the institutions and alliances of the existing international order to sustain its operations, solve serious transnational problems and help constructively accommodate roles within the existing order for newly significant nations, ranging from China to India.

The Biden administration’s vow to return multilateralism to U.S. diplomacy is a change in the right direction. Biden’s National Security Strategy noted there is a competition to shape the future of the international order and vowed to sustain America’s leading international role. The administration backed its policy words with diplomatic action in a successful campaign for the 2022 election of an American candidate over a Chinese-backed Russian to lead the U.N.’s International Telecommunications Union (ITU). China and Russia want the ITU to mandate national government control of the internet, which the U.S. and its allies oppose.

This is a good start, but the Biden administration — and its successors — will need to do more to blunt Chinese efforts to reshape the international order.

To be effective, U.S. multilateral diplomacy must be a team sport. Without consistent congressional support, Biden’s and future administrations will struggle to out-compete China. Congressional support is required to pay off U.S. arrearages and keep payments to international organizations current. Congressional funding is also needed to support a more engaged approach to multilateral diplomacy and the diplomats who conduct it.  Although Biden and the Congress share concerns about China, there is no sign this includes a shared view of the importance of U.S. multilateral diplomacy and the U.S. role in international organizations in America’s ongoing competition with China.  

To lay the foundation, the Biden administration and its successors should prepare a biennial report to Congress’ two foreign affairs committees. These reports should address the challenges facing U.S. interests and the rules-based global order, the administration’s detailed strategy for addressing them and the resources — financial and human — needed for the strategy to succeed.

With regard to resources, the American Academy of Diplomacy reported in 2022 that work needs to be done in the boiler room of American diplomacy for success on the competitive frontlines of multilateral diplomacy. China and other nations field their diplomatic best to engage in multilateral diplomacy and international organizations; the U.S. needs to do the same, beginning with making clear the work is a high priority and then training and supporting American diplomats to do it. 

While the State Department responded positively to the academy’s report, following up on its recommendations will take sustained attention, action and funding. The Biden administration and the Congress should prioritize implementing the Academy’s nuts-and-bolts recommendations.

Like the global economic landscape, the global diplomatic landscape has changed in the last three decades. The U.S. no longer towers over the landscape. It has a peer economic and diplomatic competitor in China and a host of other regional power centers that need to be engaged regularly. Additionally, transnational and global challenges that cannot be successfully dealt with bilaterally, such as climate change, increasingly affect U.S. national security. 

Former Secretary of State George Shultz noted that diplomacy is like gardening; the more attention diplomats pay to issues and relationships, the more likely they are to prevent weeds and solve problems.  

The Biden administration has renewed tilling the multilateral garden of the international order, but Congress and future administrations will need to keep working the soil for many years ahead to sustain a global order that has worked better at addressing problems and promoting progress than what preceded it — and certainly works better than one reshaped by China.

Kenneth C. Brill is a retired career foreign service officer who served as an ambassador in the Clinton and Bush administrations and was the founding director of the U.S. National Counterproliferation Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.