Don’t break out the Champagne just yet to celebrate an end to the Ukraine war

Once again, war’s dynamism shows its face. A month ago, the common belief about the Ukraine war was, “It’s a stalemate, so let’s negotiate.” Today, the cry is, “Putin’s lost, so let’s celebrate.” Celebrate the counteroffensive’s success and the opportunities it provides, yes. But the war is far from over. Vladimir Putin has neither admitted defeat nor given up on achieving his objectives.  Further, Ukraine and the allies have not achieved their strategic objectives. 

Now is the time for steady hands. There is much work, and more fighting, to do.

Liberating the Kharkiv Oblast is only a partial step toward achieving the Zelensky administration’s aims of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political sovereignty. A liberated Northeast, alone, does not put Ukraine in a strong enough position to negotiate.  Ukraine still has at least three key tasks to accomplish.

First, it must consolidate the success of the Kharkiv counteroffensive. This means attacking more slowly east to threaten Russian lines of communication; cleaning up pockets of bypassed Russian forces; defending the newly liberated areas against possible Russian counterattack — to include from aircraft and missiles; replenishing personnel and equipment lost in the offensive; and reestablishing the functioning of the Ukrainian government.  

Second, it must continue to contain military operations in the Donetsk Oblast. It’s unlikely that the Russians can break out from their defensive lines, but Ukrainian forces must weaken and create vulnerabilities in Russian positions as preparation for future offensives. 

Third, the Zelensky government must figure out a way to do in the South what they have done in the Northeast. The Kherson offensive was not a feint. It has produced important gains. The Russian forces in the South, as well as in Crimea itself, are anxious. Volodymyr Zelensky must set the conditions for taking advantage of that anxiety. Months of fighting — as well as continued sanctions and sustained, anticipatory allied logistics support — is required to succeed in these three tasks.  

Success in each of these increases the probability that Putin will be compelled to do what he otherwise would not do: realize he is defeated in Ukraine. Putin must be forced to capitulate; he will not merely give up. There are some indications that the combination of failure in his initial “quick strike” invasion and now the ejection of his troops from northern Ukraine, as well as the threat of ejection in the South, are creating new dynamics in Russia — perhaps even in Putin’s own mind. 

But the nearness of Russia’s demise is greatly exaggerated, for Putin still may double down on failure. Ukrainian generals are as Ulysses S. Grant was in early 1865. After the Battle of Sailor’s Creek in April 1865, following Gen. Robert E. Lee’s withdrawal from Richmond, Gen. Philip Sheridan wired Grant, saying, “If the thing is pressed, I think Lee will surrender.” Grant immediately wired back, “Let the thing be pressed.”

Pressing in the Ukraine war means more risk. Putin is down, very down, but he is not out. His options are more limited than at the start of the war, but he still has ways to fight back. In theater, he can increase air and missile attacks. He can use winter as a weapon, trying to erode Ukrainian resolve and allied cohesion. He can pressure Belarus to get more involved in ways that may threaten Poland. He can act out of theater — with Iran in Syria and Iraq, through North Korea, or elsewhere. And he may even be able to convince China to do something — unlikely, but not out of the question. Finally, Putin’s nuclear option remains possible, albeit also unlikely. 

These are all risks that require full attention and direct mitigation. The allies must be vigilant.   But attending to risk should not stop the allies from fully supporting Ukraine in pressing Putin.  Only by applying compelling force — military, diplomatic and economic — will Putin be put into a position to end the war.

Winning wars means accomplishing strategic aims. For the U.S., NATO and the other allies, success means enforcing the global sanction against aggression, keeping the alliance united and strong, and helping Ukraine defeat Putin’s illegal invasion. As Yale professor Timothy Snyder said in Foreign Affairs, the Ukraine war “is about establishing principles for the 21st century.”  For the Ukrainians, success means putting the Zelensky government in firm control of Ukraine’s future: self-determination, political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therein lies a potential rub.

Zelensky has spoken publicly about returning occupied Donbas and Crimea to Ukrainian control.  These are reasonable aims, especially since Russia seized and occupied both illegally. Russian aggression and war crimes simply cannot stand. But might there be diplomatic space between what must be done — ejecting Russia to their pre-February position — and what should be done — ending Russian occupation of the Donbas and Crimea? Can allied and Ukrainian diplomats use battlefield success to find a way forward with Russia that demilitarizes both regions; creates a reasonably effective security structure; and turns their political control to a multinational body temporarily, gradually returning them to the Ukrainian government? 

But while investigating these and other potential opportunities, no leader should forget that, if such a way forward is possible at all, it is through the window left open by the effective use of force.

It’s too early to celebrate. Ukraine must continue fighting, forcing Putin to understand that he has lost. The allies must continue offering their support. Together, they must engage in determined diplomacy to end the war — not just the fighting — and in the process, achieve their strategic aims while making sure that Putin achieves none of his. That’s how wars are won.

James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries.