Stop saying war has changed

In a recent opinion piece, Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth claim a revolution in military affairs may be unfolding in Ukraine. Their argument hinges on the supposed marginalization of armor (tanks and tracked combat vehicles) and an influx of drones. This contention fails to consider the context within which Russia’s war is occurring, ignores the fundamental role that armor plays on the battlefield, and makes overzealous assertions about the effectiveness of drones. Concluding that war has changed fundamentally is wrong.

Much has been made of the destruction of Russian armor by man portable anti-tank guided missiles. To be sure, the extent of Russia’s losses is impressive. Depending upon which source you consult, Russian tank losses are in the high hundreds to thousands. But are tanks being marginalized? No. People have chiseled a date onto the tank’s gravestone since its invention, and to date they have been wrong.

Of course, armor is vulnerable to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Man-portable anti-tank weapons have existed as long as armor. That’s one reason that armor has evolved: an eternal race between armor and the anti-tank weapon. Russian armor isn’t failing because it’s fundamentally inferior to the anti-tank missiles; it is failing because of poor employment.

Armor provides militaries with fast, protected, long-range, heavy firepower that is effective against vehicles and individuals. Man-portable ATGMs provide slow-moving, unprotected, long-range firepower, which is primarily effective against vehicles. However, they are only as survivable as the individual carrying them. All it takes to stop a man-portable ATGM is a pistol, whereas you need a rocket, missile or shell to destroy armor. Anti-tank weapons in Ukraine have been so effective because the Ukrainians have been defending. They don’t need to move fast; they can fight from prepared defensive positions and they know the routes Russians must use, so they can prepare and choose where to fight. 

Anti-tank weapons will not be nearly as effective in the offense, to which Ukraine must transition to achieve its political goals. The Ukrainians know this and have requested tanks themselves.

The ways Russia has lost armor are both avoidable and somewhat inherent, not harbingers of any revolution in military affairs. Russia has failed to conduct combined arms maneuver — synchronizing infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, etc. to achieve greater effects than if each were used separately. Russia repeatedly has employed armor without infantry, and frequently has utilized armor in slow-moving, tightly packed columns, which violate multiple tactical principles. These failures of employment have contributed to their losses significantly. 

If Russia used the concept of combined arms, it is likely there would be fewer Russian casualties. This calls to mind the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which it seemed that the Sagger ATGM completely nullified Israeli armor. However, the effectiveness of the Saggers was negated when Israelis began conducting combined arms maneuvers by integrating infantry and artillery suppression into their armored assaults. New technology was countered by a return to the basics.

Furthermore, claiming that armor is unable to defend against ATGMs is tenuous. The Ukrainian military assesses that the reactive armor on T80 tanks is 90 percent effective against direct attack ATGMs. Of course, this doesn’t account for top-attack ATGMs such as the Javelin or NLAW. But if armor-protection technology can evolve to be 90 percent effective against direct attack ATGMs, surely it can do so against top-attack weapons. What’s more, claims that current Russian countermeasure suites have been ineffective against ATGMs are simply not backed by substantive evidence. There has been no published study on the effectiveness of ATGMs or countermeasures, only occasionally suspect videos posted online. Additionally, if the Russians are apparently struggling to maintain basic equipment such as tires, can we be confident that far more sophisticated equipment like countermeasure suites are functioning as intended?

Finally, it is a general rule among military professionals that attackers need a force ratio of 3 to 1 to be successful. This ratio acknowledges that the attacker will suffer more casualties than the defender and therefore must bring more troops. We must view the disproportionate Russian casualty figures in that context: The attacker suffers more casualties than the defender.

Drones, too, have not fundamentally changed warfare. The belief that drones are revolutionary has increased in the past 15 years, usually in reference to the conflicts in Libya, Syria and the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Academic study of drone use in these conflicts demonstrates that, like any weapon, drones are effective when an opponent is not prepared or does not possess the technical capability to counter them. Even when effective, they do not replace conventional ground combat, and when an opponent is prepared, drones simply become another average tool in the box of combined arms.

In Syria, drones have not achieved any decisive results and all parties have become adept at destroying or jamming them. The situation in Libya was similar: Drones were ineffective in areas with well-established air-defense systems, and drone use in more permissive areas did not significantly alter the balance of power. Additionally, combat with infantry, armor and artillery was still common and necessary for either side to achieve progress. More recently, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war saw Azerbaijan use drones to great effect, but those drones were mostly the same types that were being shot down in Libya and Syria. They were effective because the Armenian military lacked the technical capability and training to counter them.  

Ukrainian defenders enjoyed much success employing drones early in the invasion. However, this was again because of Russia’s failure to conduct combined arms maneuver by not integrating electronic warfare and anti-air assets with their armor and infantry. As the war has progressed, Russia has recognized this mistake and is better synchronizing its assets to negate Ukrainian drones.

Warfare hasn’t fundamentally changed. It revolves around using all technology and capabilities in coordination. This is not to say that new technology isn’t important. However, no single technology has yet to outweigh all others, and claiming so creates the danger that policymakers will make ill-informed decisions about the future composition of our military. It is good that current leaders in NATO militaries understand this and still publicly endorse combined arms maneuver, and not technology-centric warfare.

Micah Neidorfler is a U.S. Army captain with six years’ experience as an infantry officer. His past positions include rifle platoon leader, infantry weapons company executive officer, and battalion assistant operations officer. He is a student in the Maneuver Captains Career Course at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.